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Technical abstract
The paper uses an applied general equilibrium model, calibrated to the situation in Belgium in
1990, to evaluate the welfare effects of small policy changes in the presence of transport externalities.
The model incorporates three types of externalities: congestion, which has a feedback effect on the
behaviour of the economic agents, air pollution and accidents. The model is used to perform balanced
budget incidence simulations in which the marginal cost of public funds is calculated for four alternative
policy instruments: a lump sum tax, the labour income tax, the fuel taxes and peak road pricing. For each
of these instruments the marginal cost of public funds is calculated. The results of the model are
compared with those of a model in which congestion, air pollution and accidents are assumed to remain
constant at their initial level.
The model contributes to the literature in two ways. First of all, it includes non-identical
individuals which allows to analyse the equity effects of the policy reforms. The second contribution is
related to the way in which the externalities are modelled: the feedback effect of congestion is explicitly
taken into account and the value of a marginal time saving is determined endogenously in the model. 
The simulations show that the ranking of the instruments in terms of their marginal cost of public
funds changes significantly when the effect of the reform on the externalities is taken into account.
Secondly, regardless of the way in which the tax revenue is recycled, the welfare gain of peak road pricing
is higher than that of the fuel tax. When the externality tax revenue is recycled through the lump sum tax
the welfare gains are higher for the poorer than for the richer quintiles. On the other hand, the main
beneficiary of revenue recycling through the labour income tax is the richest quintile.  Consequently,
when the social welfare function gives a higher weight to the welfare of individuals belonging to the
poorer quintiles, the distributional impacts of the policy reforms cause the welfare gain to be higher when
the revenue is recycled through an increase in the lump sum transfer rather than through a lower labour
income tax rate.
The link is made with the double dividend literature. A weak double dividend can be realised only
when all individuals are given the same welfare weight. However, the inclusion of distributional
considerations offers the possibility of realising a strong double dividend for low degrees of inequality
aversion.- 3 -
Non-technical abstract
The paper uses an applied general equilibrium model, calibrated to the situation in Belgium in
1990, to evaluate the welfare effects of small policy changes in the presence of transport externalities.
The model incorporates three types of externalities: congestion, which has a feedback effect on the
behaviour of the economic agents, air pollution and accidents. The model is used to perform balanced
budget incidence simulations in which the marginal cost of public funds is calculated for four alternative
policy instruments: a lump sum tax, the labour income tax, the fuel taxes and peak road pricing. For each
of these instruments the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) is calculated. The results of the model are
compared with those of a model in which congestion, air pollution and accidents are assumed to remain
constant at their initial level.
The information provided by this type of exercises is useful for two purposes. First of all, it
serves as an input in cost-benefit analyses. The non-tax costs of a public project should be multiplied by
the MCF of the instrument used to finance it, in order to make a correct comparison with its benefits.
Secondly, the MCF is a useful tool in deciding whether a revenue neutral policy reform is welfare
improving or not. From the theory of optimal taxation in the presence of externalities, we know that when
taxes are set optimally, the MCF is equalized across all tax instruments. Starting from a non-optimal tax
system, social welfare is increased (decreased) when the tax with the highest welfare cost per additional
unit of government revenue is reduced (increased) and when simultaneously the tax with the lowest
welfare cost per additional unit of government revenue is raised (reduced). 
The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First of all, it includes non-identical
individuals. Therefore, the evaluation of the policy instruments takes into account the equity effects of the
policy reforms. The second contribution is related to the way in which the externalities are modelled: the
feedback effect of congestion is explicitly taken into account and the value of a marginal time saving is
determined endogenously in the model. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After the introduction, we first describe the general
characteristics and the specification of the applied general equilibrium model, with a particular attention
to the modelling of the externalities. It is followed by a brief description of the initial equilibrium, which
corresponds with the situation in Belgium in 1990. Next, we discuss the results of the balanced budget
incidence simulations. The final section concludes and describes some extensions to the model.
The simulations show that the ranking of the instruments in terms of their marginal cost of public
funds changes significantly when the effect of the reform on the externalities is taken into account.
Secondly, regardless of the way in which the tax revenue is recycled, the welfare gain of peak road pricing
is higher than that of the fuel tax. When the externality tax revenue is recycled through the lump sum tax
the welfare gains are higher for the poorer than for the richer quintiles. On the other hand, the main
beneficiary of revenue recycling through the labour income tax is the richest quintile.  Consequently,
when the social welfare function gives a higher weight to the welfare of individuals belonging to the
poorer quintiles, the distributional impacts of the policy reforms cause the welfare gain to be higher when
the revenue is recycled through an increase in the lump sum transfer rather than through a lower labour
income tax rate.- 4 -
The link is made with the double dividend literature. The double dividend hypothesis claims that
the gross welfare costs of an externality tax can be compensated by two types of dividends. The first
dividend is obtained by the decrease of the externality. The second dividend is the welfare gain that can be
obtained by using the externality tax revenue to reduce existing distortionary taxes. A weak double
dividend is said to be realized if one can obtain a higher gross welfare gain by using the revenues from the
externality taxes to cut existing distortionary taxes rather than by returning the revenues in a lump sum
way. The strong double dividend hypothesis states that a revenue-neutral tax reform which consists of the
substitution of the externality tax for distortionary taxes results in zero or negative gross welfare costs.
Our simulations show that a weak double dividend can be realised only when all individuals are given the
same welfare weight. However, the inclusion of distributional considerations offers the possibility of
realising a strong double dividend for low degrees of inequality aversion. The optimal taxation in the presence of externalities is treated in, e.g., Sandmo (1975) and
2
Bovenberg & van der Ploeg (1994). The literature was adapted for the specific case of externalities with a
feedback effect in De Borger (1997) and Mayeres & Proost (1997). The last paper derives optimal tax
and investment rules for a second-best taxation model with income distribution aspects and illustrates the
theoretical insights by means of a simple AGE model calibrated to Belgium.
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I. Introduction
The paper uses an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model, calibrated to the situation in
Belgium in 1990, to evaluate the equity effects of small policy changes in the presence of externalities.
The model focuses on externalities generated by the transport sector, though air pollution caused by non-
transport energy use is also taken into account. It considers the most important externalities of transport
use, namely those related to congestion, air pollution, global warming and accidents [see, e.g., Mayeres,
Ochelen & Proost (1996)]. Other, relatively less important, external cost categories such as noise and
road damage externalities are not taken into account. The externalities which are included in the model
share the property of being characterized by a feedback effect, i.e., the level of the externality affects the
behaviour of the economic agents. E.g., the congestion level affects the use of cars and trucks; the same is
true for the accident risk, which in addition, also influences the consumption of medical care or the use of
safety devices.
The paper presents balanced budget incidence simulations. These involve an increase in
separable government spending which is financed by a change in a tax instrument such that government
budget balance is maintained. The paper considers four alternative instruments for financing the increase
in government spending: a lump sum tax, the labour income tax, the fuel tax and peak road pricing. For
each of these instruments the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) is calculated. The results of the model
are compared with those of a model without externalities, in order to assess the importance of
incorporating the externalities in the analysis. It is shown that the inclusion of the impacts on the
externalities changes the policy recommendations significantly. The information provided by this type of
exercises is useful for two purposes. First of all, it serves as an input in cost-benefit analyses. The non-
tax costs of a public project should be multiplied by the MCF of the instrument used to finance it, in order
to make a correct comparison with its benefits [see, e.g., Stiglitz & Dasgupta (1971), Atkinson & Stern
(1974)]. Secondly, the MCF is a useful tool in deciding whether a revenue neutral policy reform is welfare
improving or not. From the theory of optimal taxation in the presence of externalities , we know that
2
when taxes are set optimally, the MCF is equalized across all tax instruments. Starting from a non-
optimal tax system, social welfare is increased (decreased) when the tax with the highest welfare cost per
additional unit of government revenue is reduced (increased) and when simultaneously the tax with the
lowest welfare cost per additional unit of government revenue is raised (reduced). 
A comparison is made of the welfare change of a small increase in the fuel tax and the
introduction of peak road pricing for two different ways of revenue recycling: an increase in the poll
transfer and a decrease in the labour income tax rate. This provides a link with the double dividend
literature. The double dividend hypothesis claims that the gross welfare costs of an externality tax can be
compensated by two types of dividends. The first dividend is obtained by the decrease of the externality.
The second dividend is the welfare gain that can be obtained by using the externality tax revenue to Examples of partial equilibrium models are, e.g., Glaister & Lewis (1978), Small (1983), Viton
3
(1980,1983), De Borger et al. (1996) and De Borger et al. (1997). These models determine optimal
transport policies in the presence of externalities.
 In Beaumais and Schubert (1994) environmental quality affects the choice between green and
4
standard consumer goods. Espinosa & Smith (1995) assume that the choice between medical care and
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reduce existing distortionary taxes. A weak double dividend is said to be realized if one can obtain a
higher gross welfare gain by using the revenues from the externality taxes to cut existing distortionary
taxes rather than by returning the revenues in a lump sum way. The strong double dividend hypothesis
states that a revenue-neutral tax reform which consists of the substitution of the externality tax for
distortionary taxes results in zero or negative gross welfare costs. This implies that no information is
needed about the benefits of the externality reduction in order to justify the externality tax. A general
discussion of the issue is presented in, e.g., Goulder (1995). An analytical treatment can be found in, e.g.,
Bovenberg & de Mooij (1994) and Parry (1995). A numerical analysis for Belgium in the case of a
carbon-energy tax is given in Proost & Van Regemorter (1995). 
It is clear that the general equilibrium approach offers a clear advantage over the partial
equilibrium models which are commonly used to study policies for the control of transport externalities .
3
It allows to take into account the interaction between those policies and public finance. This is especially
relevant since the externality taxes serve the dual purpose of, on the one hand, internalising the transport
externalities and, on the other hand, financing the public sector.
The paper is closely related to Ballard & Medema (1993), Bovenberg & Goulder (1997) and
Brendemoen & Vennemo (1996). It contributes to this literature first of all because it evaluates the equity
effects of the policy reforms. The AGE model includes non-identical individuals and allows to analyse the
distributional impacts of the policy changes. A second difference, compared to Bovenberg & Goulder
(1997) is that they consider only the gross welfare costs of environmental policy measures. The
motivation for introducing environmental policies is assumed to be external to the model. In this respect
their approach is similar to that of a number of other AGE models which are used for the evaluation of
environmental policies [see, e.g., Stephan (1989), Conrad & Schröder (1990), Hazilla & Kopp (1990),
Jorgenson & Wilcoxen (1990), Bergman (1991), Nestor & Pasurka (1995)]. Though these models go
slightly further in that they model the generation of the externalities, they do not model their impact on
the economic system. In Ballard & Medema (1993) and Brendemoen & Vennemo (1996) the evaluation
of a policy change depends not only on its costs but on the relation between its costs and benefits. In both
models the level of the externality has an impact on economic welfare directly through the utility function
of the representative household. However, the externality is introduced as providing a separable
contribution to the household’s welfare. Other AGE models which use this approach are Bergman (1993),
Perroni & Wigle (1994), Proost & Van Regemorter (1995) and Capros et al. (1997a). The present paper
relaxes the separability assumption in the case of the congestion externality: the consumers’ allocation of
expenditure over the different goods is affected by the level of congestion. In the literature a limited
number of AGE models can be found in which the separability assumption is relaxed. Examples are
Beaumais & Schubert (1994), Espinosa & Smith (1995), Pireddu (1996) and Mayeres & Proost (1997) .
4other consumption goods is affected by morbidity which is determined by the level of air pollution. In
Pireddu (1996) the pollution level determines the demand for a composite defensive commodity. Mayeres
& Proost (1997) assume that the congestion level determines the demand for the congestion generating
goods.
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The modelling of the congestion externality in our paper is based on DeSerpa (1971) and Bruzelius
(1979). In the case of air pollution and accidents however, the model continues to assume that consumer
preferences are separable in these two externalities, though in reality they have a feedback effect similar
to that of congestion. The indirect impact on economic welfare through the productivity of inputs at the
production side is modelled in Ballard & Medema (1993). Another example is Bergman (1993). In our
study we assume that the productivity of inputs is related negatively to the level of congestion.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we describe the general characteristics and
specification of the AGE model which is used for the calculations, with a particular attention to the
modelling of the externalities. After a brief description of the initial equilibrium, which corresponds with
the situation in Belgium in 1990, we discuss the results of the balanced budget incidence simulations. The
final section concludes and describes some extensions to the model.
II. The Applied General Equilibrium Model
The AGE model is a static model for a small open economy. It is used to simulate the effects of
policy changes and in doing so it assumes that flows can adjust immediately in order to clear markets.
This implies that the time horizon of the model is longer than the short term, since in the short run slow
price adjustments can prevent markets from clearing or inflexibilities can result in excess profits or non-
optimal allocations. On the other hand, the reference period is shorter than the long run. This is because
the stock of the flexible capital good is assumed to be fixed, i.e., independent from savings, which results
in a fixed supply of capital services. The flexibility of the stock of capital goods means that their services
can be shifted between sectors without costs. Savings are modelled as purchases of capital goods which
add to the stock of the capital goods only in a future period which is not considered by the model. This is
a common procedure in AGE modelling. Examples can be found in, e.g., Keller (1980), Dervis et al.
(1982) and Serra-Puche (1984). The approach poses an upper limit to the time horizon of the model. The
upper limit should be such that the increase in the capital stock is small compared to the level of the stock
in the initial equilibrium. We conclude that the time horizon is the medium term. This implies that only
durable goods with a long lifespan should be considered as capital goods. As a consequence, our analysis
assumes that transport vehicles do not belong to the category of capital goods. The medium term horizon
is also motivated by the assumption that economic agents cannot change their location in response to
policy changes.
The model focuses on transport issues, which implies that transport is modelled in a quite
detailed way. A distinction is made between different transport modes (road, rail, inland navigation),
between vehicle types and between two periods of time in the case of road transport (peak and off-peak
road transport). In contrast to the network models which are often used in the transport literature, the

















basic premise is that the network has homogeneous traffic conditions and can be represented as if it were
a one-link system. The model includes three types of transport externalities: congestion, air pollution
(including global warming) and accidents. Four types of economic agents are considered: the consumers,
the production sectors, the government and the foreign sector. The next section discusses first in general
terms the modelling of the behaviour of the economic agents. The presentation focuses on the way in
which the externalities are modelled. For a more detailed description of the model, the reader is referred to
Mayeres (1998a). Afterwards, we turn to the model specification and implementation.
1. A General Description of the Applied General Equilibrium Model
There are J goods in the economy (j=1, . . . ,J). A distinction is made between transport and non-
transport goods (r=TP,NTP). There are M transport goods (r=TP; m=1, . . . ,M) and K non-transport
goods (r=NTP; k=1, . . . ,K) with M+K=J. The Kth non-transport good is taken to be the capital good .
5
 a. The Consumers
There are I consumer groups, each consisting of a (i=1,...,I) identical individuals. Two
i
individuals belonging to a different consumer group differ in terms of two characteristics: their
productivity, which is captured by the efficiency parameter of labour hours supplied (e) and their tastes.
i
Individuals belonging to the same consumer group are however assumed to be identical in terms of their
needs. Each individual has a fixed endowment of capital goods, which provides a fixed supply of capital
services (c). It is also endowed with a fixed amount of time  (T). The utility of each individual belonging
i
to consumer group i is given by: 
Utility U is determined by three components. The first component is direct utility f  derived from goods
i                        i
U
consumption and time use. The second component is the utility related to the emission level of air
pollutants and is represented by f (EM). EM is the vector of emissions of different air pollutants. EM
i
Finally, utility is a function of the number of transport accidents which is reflected by f (ACC). ACC is ACC
i
a vector of accidents occurring to the different transport modes. The exact form of f (EM) and EM
i
f (ACC) is discussed in a later section. It is assumed that the individual’s preferences are separable in ACC
i
EM and ACC, i.e. the allocation of expenditure over goods consumption and time use is independent of
EM and ACC.  EM and ACC are assumed to affect the welfare of the individuals negatively (MU/MEM<0,
i
MU/MACC<0). In its behaviour each individual is assumed to ignore his own impact on EM and ACC. He
i
considers himself to be infinitely small compared to society. 
The separability assumption, which is maintained for air pollution and accidents, is relaxed in the
case of congestion. Our approach is based on the theoretical reasoning introduced by Becker (1965)
which was elaborated, inter alia, by Johnson (1966), Oort (1969), DeSerpa (1971) and Bruzelius (1979).
Here we adapt the exposition of DeSerpa (1971) and Bruzelius (1979). The function f  is defined as a U
i
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assumed to be quasi-concave in its arguments, continuous and twice differentiable. xh  is a K vector of NTP
i
non-transport goods consumed by each individual belonging to consumer group i. The individual’s
consumption of the non-transport good k is denoted by xh  (xh $0). The K-th non-transport good NTP,k   NTP,k
i  i
is the capital good which is used to model the savings decision. Since we use the static equilibrium
approach intertemporal decisions such as savings and investment can be modelled only in a very crude
way. Following e.g., Keller (1980), Dervis et al. (1982) and Serra-Puche (1984) consumer savings are
modelled by means of the demand for the capital good, the services of which will be sold in the future to
earn a rental as a compensation for the postponement of consumption. The consumers can also save by
purchasing government bonds, which are assumed to be a perfect substitute for the physical capital good
(cf. infra).  xh  is an M vector of transport goods consumed by each individual belonging to group i TP
i
(xh =(xh ,...,xh ) with xh $0). Total leisure consumed by the individual is denoted by lh TP TP,1 TP,M     TP,m
i i i     i                     i
(lh$0). Total time allocated to transport good m is denoted by 2h . It is assumed for each individual
i                       i
TP,m
that all transport goods are consumed one at a time and that all available time is spent either in the
consumption of the transport goods, or in leisure or labour.
Utility is assumed to be maximized subject to two types of constraints: the budget constraint and
the time allocation constraints. The budget constraint of each individual belonging to group i is given by
expression (2). 
It states that the sum of the money costs of consumption and the cost of leisure time and of time allocated
to transport cannot exceed full income. The consumer price of the non-transport and transport goods is
given by qh  and qh  respectively. The net domestic wage rate received by an individual belonging NTP,k    TP,m
to group i is denoted by wh. It equals the product of the gross domestic wage rate per efficiency unit and
i
the number of efficiency units per hour of labour supplied e, from which the labour income tax is
i
subtracted. Full income consists of non-labour income (P+qh c) and wage income which would have
i i
C
been obtained if the individual devoted all his time to labour (wh (T- )+wabh   )
i  i
minus net international transfers ( ) which are assumed to be constant. P is the poll transfer
i
received from the government. c gives the capital services rendered by the capital stock owned by the
i
individual. The capital services are sold at a price qh . It is assumed that c is a constant. T is the total C
i
time available to each individual and is also constant. It is assumed that each individual devotes a fixed
amount of time ( ) to labour abroad for which he receives a net wage rate wabh. This equals the
i
gross wage rate per efficiency unit paid to exported labour multiplied by the number of efficiency units e,
i
from which the labour income tax is substracted.
The time allocation constraints for the transport goods, given in (3), state that for each transport
good, the total time allocated to it should be at least as large as the minimum time requirement.MU i/Mlh i























The minimum time requirement is defined as the product of the total consumption of the transport good
by the individual (e.g., the number of pkm travelled) and the time requirement per unit of the transport
good (2h ). The latter depends on the level of congestion Z, which is a function of the capacity of the TP,m
*
road infrastructure and of total traffic volume, as will be discussed later. It is assumed that each
individual considers the minimum time requirement to be given exogenously, and therefore does not take
into account the effect of his own transport decisions on this minimum requirement. 
From the first order conditions of the individual’s maximization problem it can be derived that
the marginal value of time spent in leisure is given by the net wage, on condition that there are no
restrictions on labour time:
8 is the Langrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint and is interpreted as the marginal
i
utility of income.
Secondly, the value of a marginal time saving in transport can be shown to equal the difference
between the marginal value of time spent in leisure and the marginal value of the satisfaction of time
allocated to transport.
(  is the Langrange multiplier of the time allocation constraint for good m and can be interpreted as the TP,m
i
marginal utility of saving time in transport. The value of a marginal time saving in transport will be
nonzero if the time allocation constraint is binding for the transport good. In that case the marginal value
of leisure time is higher than the marginal value of time devoted to the transport good and utility can be
increased by transferring time from transport to leisure. If the time allocation constraint is nonbinding for
transport, utility cannot be increased by transferring time from transport to leisure and the marginal value
of a time saving in transport is zero. In the model it will be assumed that the time allocation constraints
are binding for all transport activities, or, in other words, that the individuals wish to spend less time on
transport than what is required. From (5) it is clear that the value of a marginal time saving is determined
endogenously in the model. This contrasts with the generalized cost approach which is commonly used in
transport models. In this approach, the demand for transport is a function of the generalized cost, which is
the sum of the money price of the transport good and the time requirement multiplied by an exogenous
value of time.
Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint and the time allocation
constraints gives rise to the following general demand functions. They indicate that the level of
congestion Z has an effect on the behaviour of the individuals, in contrast to the level of EM or ACC. This
is because of the fact that air pollution and accidents are assumed to make a separable contribution to the
individual’s welfare, while this assumption is dropped for congestion. For each individual belonging to
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The indirect utility function of an individual belonging to consumer group i can be defined as:
 b. The Domestic Production Sectors
In each domestic production sector j we consider a representative firm which is assumed to
maximize its profits under the hypothesis of perfect competition. Each representative firm produces gross
output under a constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Production requires the input of capital
services, labour, transport and non-transport goods. The productivity of the inputs is assumed to be
affected negatively by the level of congestion Z. However, air pollution and accidents do not affect the
production side of the economy. In the optimization problem it is assumed that each firm considers the
level of congestion Z to be exogenous, i.e. it believes not to contribute itself to the level of Z. 
The domestic production sectors do not only sell their goods in the domestic market but also
abroad. The export of domestically produced goods requires an additional input of transport goods and
transport labour. Each export producing sector j is assumed to minimize its costs of producing a given
amount of exports subject to the production function. Also in this case the productivity of the transport
goods and labour is negatively related to the congestion level Z. 
 c. The Foreign Sector
Following Armington (1969) foreign goods are assumed to be different from domestic goods,
though they might be close substitutes for one another. Homogeneity of domestic and foreign goods
would lead to a tendency towards specialization when coupled with the small country assumption, which
is not observed in reality, and would give rise to unrealistic trade elasticities. Therefore, we follow the
approach used in many other models [see, e.g., Keller (1980), Dervis et al. (1982)] and adopt the
Armington formulation which allows one to keep aggregative commodity categories across countries but
specifies product differentiation by country of origin into the structure of demand. The approach
constructs an aggregate or composite commodity for each tradeable which is a function of the imported
and domestic variety of the good. Given the prices of the two varieties, the combination of the imported
and domestic variety is chosen such that the cost of producing a given amount of the composite good is
minimised.
The import of goods and services requires transport in Belgium. This causes the import price to
be different from the cif-price (i.e., the import price which includes all costs up to the border of the
importing country). In the AGE model the cif-price of the imported goods is taken to be fixed and acts as
a numéraire. The foreign sector which imports the goods in Belgium is assumed to choose the input of
foreign transport goods and foreign labour for transport in Belgium such that the costs of delivering a
given amount of imports in Belgium are minimised. The productivity of transport labour and the transport
goods is assumed to be affected negatively by the level of congestion in Belgium. exj ’ exj pwj pxj
0xj








On the export side, remaining faithful to the small-open-country assumption would entail that the
country’s export prices are fixed in the world market and do no depend on the quantities exported. But
this is inconsistent with the assumption that products are differentiated by country of origin and imperfect
substitutes for one another. This assumption leads to less than infinitely elastic demand functions for the
country’s exports. Based on Dervis et al. (1982) we use the following constant elasticity demand function
to determine the export demands ex for each good j:  j
 is the world price (expressed in terms of the domestic currency) and is treated as fixed, given the fact
that the domestic country is small. The export price of the domestic products is denoted by px. 0x equals j   j
minus the price elasticity of export demand.   is a positive constant representing total world demand
for good j. A change in px is assumed not to affect the world price of good j, nor the total demand for the j
good, but it does have an impact on the country’s market share.
Transit transport in the domestic country is transport unconnected to domestic production, import
or export. It is included it the model because of its contribution to congestion, air pollution and accidents.
The demand for transit transport (tt) in the country is determined in the following way:
where   is the price of transit transport abroad, which is assumed to be constant, ptt is the price of
transit transport in the country,   is a constant representing total demand for international transport by
foreign firms. 0t equals minus the elasticity of transit transport in the country with respect to ptt. Transit
transport in Belgium is produced with as inputs foreign transport goods and foreign labour. The transit
sector is assumed to minimise its costs of producing a given amount of transport in Belgium subject to a
CRS production technology. The productivity of the input factors is related negatively to the level of
congestion Z in Belgium. 
 d. The Government
A single government includes government activities at all levels: federal, regional and local. The
government is modelled as if it were a single consumer, which maximizes a utility function defined over
the K non-transport goods, subject to a budget constraint. The spending of the government on the K non-
transport goods is assumed not to enter the utility function of the consumers as public goods. Government
income consists of the sum of tax revenue and revenue from the sale of capital services rendered by the
capital stock owned by the government, minus the poll transfers paid to the consumers, the remuneration
of capital services, subsidies paid by the government to the domestic production sectors and net
government transfers to the rest of the world (which are assumed to be constant).The government may
spend more than this income. If this is the case, the government deficit appears as a positive endowment
of capital tomorrow in its budget constraint. Implicitly, it is assumed that the government can run a deficit
by selling bonds which the consumers consider as perfect substitutes for physical capital as savings
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The government can make use of several tax instruments. First of all, it levies an income tax on
the labour and capital income of the consumers. Secondly, it can levy excises on the input of transport
and non-transport goods by the domestic production sectors and the consumers and indirect taxes on the
consumers’ consumption. Furthermore, it can make use of externality taxes on the consumption of non-
transport energy goods and transport goods. For the transport goods, the externality taxes can also be
levied on the use of transport goods by foreign firms (associated with import or transit transport).
 e. The Determinants of Congestion, Air Pollution and Accidents
The model considers three types of externalities: those related to congestion (Z), air pollutant
emissions (EM) and accidents (ACC). The previous sections already discussed the way in which these
three phenomena affect the economic agents. This section describes in general terms the determinants of
Z, EM and ACC. The congestion level is determined by the relationship between the traffic flow F and the
capacity of the transport infrastructure CAP. The congestion level increases with traffic flow and
decreases with the capacity of the infrastructure.
We define the total use of transport good m (X ) as  TP,m
It equals the sum of the total use of the transport good m by the consumers (3 a xh ), by the domestic i    TP,m
i  i
production sectors for the transport of domestically demanded goods (3 xp ) , by the domestic j  TP,m
j
production sectors for export related transport in Belgium (3 xx ), by the foreign sectors for import j  TP,m
j
related transport in Belgium (3 xab ) and by transit transport in Belgium (xt ). Defining X   as j  TP,m               TP,m     TP
j
X =(X ,...,X ), the traffic flow relevant for the determination of the congestion level is obtained in TP TP,1 TP,M
the following way:
In the present version of the AGE model CAP is assumed to be constant. This assumption will be relaxed
in later versions of the model.
The emissions of the different air pollutants are a function of the total use of transport and non-
transport energy goods. We define the total consumption of the non-transport energy good en as
It equals the sum of the consumption of the good by the consumers (3 a xh ) and by the domestic i    NTP,en
i  i
production sectors (3 xp ). The level of emission of air pollutant po is defined as j  NTP,en
j
emtp  and emen  are emission factors which give the emissions of pollutant po per unit of po,m    po,en
consumption of the transport good m and the non-transport energy good en respectively. The function fEM
i


































mu  is the marginal utility to each individual of consumer group i of a decrease in the emissions of AP,po
i
pollutant po. EM  gives the total emissions of pollutant po in the reference equilibrium. po
ref
The number of accidents depends on the total use of the transport goods. ACC  gives the m
n
number of accidents of type n in which transport mode m is the victim. A distinction is made between
four accident types: fatality, serious injury, light injury and material damage. ACC  is defined as  m
n
As before, the index m stands for the transport modes. So does the index v, but in addition this index
includes external objects (such as a wall or a tree) as a category. ar  is the probability that an accident m,v
n
of type n occurs between transport modes m and v in which m is the victim.
The function f  is defined as follows: ACC
i
It is the sum over all accident type categories n of the marginal utility of  a decrease in the number of
accidents of type n (mu ) times the total reduction in the number of accidents of type n with respect to ACC,n
i
the initial equilibrium.
 f. The Market Equilibrium Conditions
In the equilibrium, the following market equilibrium conditions must hold: 
(i) on the labour market: the sum of labour supplied to the domestic market by the consumers and
by the rest of the world should equal the sum of total labour demanded by the domestic production
sectors.
(ii) on the market for capital services: the total supply of capital services by the consumers
should equal total demand of capital services by the domestic production sectors, the government and the
rest of the world.
(iii) on the market for the capital good: the sum of the supply of capital goods by the domestic
production sectors and by the government (which sells bonds in order to finance its government deficit)
should equal the domestic demand for the domestic variety of the good and the export demand. 
(iv) on the other goods markets: the supply of the good by the domestic production sectors
should equal the sum of the domestic demand for the domestic variety and the export demand.
(v) on the balance of payments: the total outflow of funds to the foreign sector should equal the
total inflow. The outflow of funds consists of the value of imports, the value of imported labour, the net
international transfers by the government and by the consumers. The inflow of funds equals the sum of
the value of exports, the value of exported labour and the externality taxes levied by the Belgian
government on the use of transport in Belgium by foreign economic agents. A trade deficit on the part of
the foreign sector is assumed to be offset by the sale of capital goods to the domestic consumers such that
the balance of payments is in equilibrium. This good is considered by them as a perfect substitute for
physical capital. In the simulations it is assumed that the deficit remains constant at the level of the initial- 15 -
equilibrium.
 g. Investment
Although the model is static, we have to take into account the investment that takes place during
the period which is considered. The value of total physical investment in the economy is defined as the
sum of consumer savings and government investment minus the government deficit and the surplus on the
balance of payments (which is observed in the initial equilibrium and which is assumed to be offset by the
sale of capital services by the rest of the world to the domestic economy; cf. supra).
2. The Model Specification
This section discusses in more detail the specification of the model presented in the previous
sections. Table 1 gives an overview of the goods considered in the model. The table makes a distinction
between four types, which refer to the different production technologies of the sectors in which they are
produced. We limit the discussion here to the specification of the consumers’ utility function and the
congestion function. A discussion of the specification for the domestic production sectors, the
government and the foreign sector is presented in Mayeres (1998a).
 a. The Consumers
The direct utility function f  of each individual belonging to consumer group i is a nested U
i
function with 10 levels (w=0,...,9) defined over the excess quantities of the different goods and time uses.
The nested structure is presented in Figures 1a and 1b. At the top level (w=0) the utility component is a
Cobb-Douglas type of function. At this level the individuals allocate their resources between present
goods and time consumption on the one hand and future consumption on the other hand. Modelling this
decision with the help of a Cobb-Douglas type of function implies a fixed marginal propensity to save.
All other utility components, with the exception of those at level 8, are specified as linear homogeneous
Modified Constant Elasticity of Substitution (MCES) functions [Keller (1976)] of the associated utility
components at the next level.
Figures 1a and 1b do not require a lot of additional information, except about levels 6 to 8. At
w=6 the utility component corresponding with passenger kilometres travelled by different car types is
modelled as a MCES function of committed and supplementary mileage. This way the simultaneous
decision about car ownership and car use is introduced in the AGE model. The approach is based on
Koopman (1995) and Conrad & Schröder (1991) who consider the joint choice of the ownership of a
durable and its use in an aggregate model. In contrast to the disaggregate models [e.g., Train (1986), De
Jong (1990)] which explain behaviour at the level of the decision making unit, the aggregate models try to
describe the aggregate demand of durables and their associated nondurables as a function- 16 -
Table 1: Classification of the domestic production sectors
no. Type I no. Type II no. Type III no. Type IV
1 Capital goods 5a Peak bus tram
2a Electricity 2a2 3a
2b Solid fuels tram metro 2a3 3c
2c Petrol products 6a Peak passenger 3e
2d Gas 3g
3 Transport passenger rail 3h
4 Transport
9 Other goods and 2c2b
vehicle services 2b3 3i
maintenance 8 Inland 2c1
services 2c3
5b Off peak bus 3b
6b Off-peak 2b2














Solid fuels Gasoline van
Solids electricity Diesel van
sector Truck
Solids production Bus, tram,
sectors metro
























of a number of variables that describe the goods or their consumers. The approach of Conrad & 
Schröder (1991) is based on the assumption that ownership of a durable (a car) implies a minimum
consumption of nondurables (fuel, maintenance etc.).  The cost per unit of the durable then consists not
only of the price of the durable itself but also of the sum over all associated nondurables of the price of
the nondurable times the amount of the nondurable needed per unit of the durable. In addition to the
minimum consumption of the nondurables complementary to the use of the durable, the consumers may
decide to consume more than the minimum of the nondurable. This part of the consumption of the
nondurable is termed the substitutable part. Conrad & Schröder give an interpretation of this approach
for the case of cars: they say that ownership of a car implies a minimum fuel input which results from the
maximum fuel efficiency which can be obtained by driving carefully. But the driver can choose to
consume more fuel by changing his driving style. Koopman (1995) uses a similar approach and provides
an intuitively more appealing interpretation. He starts from the assumption that owning a car implies a
certain minimum mileage, or, in other words, that people will only decide to buy a car when they know
that they will drive at least a minimum number of miles with it. The minimum mileage is termed the
committed mileage. The assumption is corroborated by evidence from the disaggregate models. For the2
d
TP,m ’ A1,m A2(CAP) % A3(CAP) ( exp A4(CAP) ( F d
 For details on the construction of the data set and on the calibration of the model, see Mayeres
6
(1998b).
 The large AGE models in the Shoven-Whalley tradition generally have a central estimate of
7
0.15 for the uncompensated wage elasticity [see e.g., Ballard et al. (1985)]. Ballard & Medema (1993)
use 0.1 and 0.25 as their central estimate.
- 17 -
(20)
Netherlands, e.g., it is found that this minimum mileage is approximately 69% of average annual mileage
[De Jong (1990)]. The costs of the vehicle are completely assigned to the committed mileage. In addition,
the cost per unit of committed mileage includes the fuel, maintenance and time costs. The individual
consumer can choose to drive more than the minimum kilometrage. This is called the supplementary
mileage. The cost per unit of supplementary mileage does not include the vehicle costs. At w=7
committed and supplementary mileage are a MCES function of physical pkm and transport time. At w=8,
committed mileage is a Leontief-type function of vehicle km (vkm), fuel and maintenance. In the case of
supplementary mileage pkm is a Leontief function of fuel and maintenance only. 
 b. The Congestion Function
The model includes a time-flow relationship which gives the minimum time requirement per unit
of transport as a function of the traffic flow F and the capacity of the transport infrastructure (CAP). The
time flow relationship is based on the one derived by Kirwan et al. (1995) from simulations with a
network model, which is used to compute the impact on average speed of a proportional increase in all
trips. Kirwan et al. (1995) conclude that the exponential type of time-flow relationship is the most
satisfying. They propose the following general form:
2  is the minimum time requirement for transport good m in period d (d=peak, off-peak). F  is the TP,m
d                              d
traffic flow in period d in millions of passenger car units (PCU). For the road transport goods the traffic
flow depends on the number of cars, road public transport vehicles and trucks. Other transport goods are
assumed not to contribute to congestion on the road network. A ,A ,A  and A  are the parameters of the 1,m 2 3    4
time flow relationship. For rail transport and inland navigation A  and A  are assumed to be zero, which 3    4
implies a constant speed.
3. The Implementation of the Model
The starting point of the exercises is a reference equilibrium calibrated to the situation in
Belgium in 1990 . The calibration of the model starts with the selection of parameters. The average 
6
uncompensated labour supply elasticity equals 0.55 in the benchmark equilibrium, while the average
compensated labour supply elasticity equals 1.1. This implies a higher sensitivity than what is generally
assumed in AGE models . However, it is in line with evidence found by Hansson & Stuart (1985) who
7
derive a median aggregate wage and total income elasticity on the basis of a survey of the literature. By
taking a weighted average over estimates of labour supply elasticities of the more sophisticated studies in
the literature, they obtain an aggregate medium wage and total income elasticity of 0.44 and -0.08 resp.- 18 -
This evidence is corroborated by later work of the same authors [Hansson & Stuart (1993)]. Fitting a
simplified general equilibrium model to aggregate data from a cross-section of 22 OECD economies, they
derive an uncompensated wage elasticity of 0.66 and a compensated wage elasticity of 1.36 (with a
standard error of 0.15 and 0.14 respectively) which is in line with their earlier findings. The authors also
present uncompensated and compensated wage elasticities for the representative household in each of the
OECD countries. For Belgium this gives an uncompensated and compensated wage elasticity of resp. 1.1
and 1.7. The central value assumed in our AGE model is lower than this value for Belgium, but is line
with the central estimates of both studies by Hansson & Stuart. 
The average uncompensated own-price and income elasticities of a number of consumer goods in
the initial equilibrium are presented in Table 2. On the producer side, the elasticities of substitution are
based on Capros et al. (1997b). The elasticities of substitution for freight transport are chosen on the
basis of the elasticity estimates presented in Oum, Waters & Yong (1992).
Table 2: The Average Uncompensated Own Price Elasticities and the Average Income
Elasticities in the Initial Equilibrium
Average own price elasticity Average income
elasticity
Peak Off-peak
Car mileage (gasoline car)
  Committed mileage -0.16 -0.43 0.7




 Bus, tram, metro -0.19 -0.28
 Rail -0.37 -0.43
Non-transport energy
 Electricity -0.77 1.53
 Solid fuels -0.40 0.69
 Petrol products -0.39 0.69
 Gas -0.39 0.69
Capital goods -0.69 0.99
Other goods and services -0.74 1.08
The valuation of the externalities is based on the following sources. For the consumers, the value
of a marginal time saving in transport is based on a willingness-to-pay study for the Netherlands [Hague
Consulting Group (1990), Bradley (1990), Bradley & Gunn (1990)]. Table 3 gives an overview of the
VOT in the initial equilibrium. In the paper all monetary values are expressed in prices of 1990.
8
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Table 3: The Value of a Marginal Time Saving in the Initial Equilibrium [ECU/h]
8
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
Peak car 2.414 2.720 3.747 4.884 7.244
Off-peak car 2.147 2.419 3.332 4.344 6.442
Peak bus, tram, metro 1.898 2.277 2.733 3.834 5.685
Off-peak bus, tram, metro 1.546 1.855 2.226 3.123 4.631
Source: based on Hague Consulting Group (1990), Bradley (1990), Bradley & Gunn (1990)
Table 4 gives the elasticity of the VOT w.r.t. its determinants in the initial equilibrium for persons
belonging to the third quintile. The VOT is related positively to the wage rate and to the minimum time
requirement. For car transport, the VOT is a negative function of the money price, while the opposite is
true for bus, tram and metro transport.
Table 4: The Elasticity of the VOT with respect to its Main Determinants in the 
Initial Equilibrium (Quintile 3) 
The elasticity of the VOT w.r.t.
Wage rate        Money price of Minimum time
the transport requirement
good
Peak car 1.144 -0.134 0.715
Off-peak car 1.278 -0.259 0.277
Peak bus, tram, metro 1.429 0.028 2.407
Off-peak bus, tram, metro 1.767 0.134 2.123
The calibration of mu  and mu  is based on the value for the marginal external air AP,po    ACC,n
i    i
pollution and accident costs. Table 5 summarizes the marginal external air pollution costs in the initial
equilibrium. The model includes the following air pollutants: NO , SO , HC, CO, CO  and particulate x   2       2
matter with a diameter smaller than 10 and 2.5 microns (PM  and PM  resp.). The methodology for the 10    2.5
calculation is to a large extent similar to the one presented in Mayeres, Ochelen & Proost (1996).
However, we have chosen to integrate as much as possible recent information provided by the Extern-E
project [Bickel et al. (1997), Hurley et al. (1997), Holland (1997)]. The marginal social air pollution
costs consist mainly of health damage costs.- 20 -
Table 5: The Marginal External Costs of Air Pollution in the Initial Equilibrium
NOTE: all values are expressed in 10  ECU/g per 1000 000 persons; the values for CO and CO  are expressed in 10  ECU/kg
-3                              -3
2
per 1000 000 persons
Marginal external Marginal external
air pollution costs air pollution costs
NO 0.196 CO 1.235 x
SO 0.561 PM 21.815 2





The methodology for calculating the marginal external accident costs is similar to that presented
in Mayeres, Ochelen & Proost (1996). Per 1000 000 persons these costs equal 2.3 10  ECU/vkm for cars
-3
in the initial equilibrium, 9.097 10  ECU/vkm for buses, 0.013 10  ECU/vkm for trams, 1.307 10
-3          -3          -3
ECU/vkm for trucks and 17.661 10  ECU/pkm for nonmotorized transport. The high costs for non-
-3
motorized transport are explained by the relatively high accident risks of this mode.
Table 6: The Marginal External Costs of Road Transport in the Initial Equilibrium
Marginal External Costs Taxes as Percentage of
(ECU/vkm) Marginal External Costs
Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Passenger transport
Non-business car vkm
  Gasoline car 0.221 0.073 35% 104%
  Diesel car 0.264 0.116 18% 42%
  LPG car 0.216 0.068 17% 53%
Business car vkm
  Gasoline car 0.221 0.073 14% 42%
  Diesel car 0.264 0.116 7% 16%
  LPG car 0.216 0.068 5% 17%
Bus, tram, metro vkm
 Electric vehicles 0.367 0.071 0% 0%
 Diesel vehicles 0.900 0.603 11% 17%
Road freight transport
Gasoline van 0.218 0.071 20% 63%
Diesel van 0.271 0.123 9% 21%
Truck 0.692 0.396 14% 25%
On the basis of these values we can calculate the marginal external costs of the different
transport modes in the initial equilibrium. Table 6 gives an overview of these costs and compares them
with the taxes which are paid. It is clear that for most transport modes and periods the marginal external











in the off-peak air pollution and accidents are relatively more important.
III. The Balanced Budget Incidence Simulations 
Once the parameters of the AGE model have been determined, it is used to undertake
simulations. First, the reference equilibrium is replicated. Next, the model performs so-called revised case
simulations. The difference between the two is that in the revised case simulations the policy instruments
are changed. The revised case simulations are of the balanced budget incidence type. We introduce a
small increase in the level of separable government expenditure. The separability assumption is crucial. If
it were relaxed, the analysis should have to take into account the relationship between taxed private goods
and the change in government expenditure. The change in government spending is accompanied by a
change in the tax system such that government budget balance is maintained. The paper considers several
ways to finance the increase in government expenditure. For each alternative instrument g the marginal
cost of public funds (MCF ) is computed. The MCF  gives the marginal cost in terms of social welfare of g         g
raising an additional unit of government revenue by means of instrument g. It is defined as the negative
ratio of the monetary value of the change in social welfare (dSW ) and the change in government revenue g
(dREV ) brought about by instrument g.  g
As regards the denominator of (21) it is assumed that each instrument generates an equal yield for
reasons of comparability. This is important because otherwise the differences between the scenarios
would be a mixture of the effects of differences in the tax system with those of differences in the size of
the government. There are several possible definitions of equal yield [see, Shoven & Whalley (1977)].
The policy reforms generally lead to differences in equilibrium prices across the different scenarios.
Therefore, assuming that the government receives the same amount of money in each scenario is not
satisfactory, since the goods that it buys with that money have a different price in each of them. Based on
Shoven & Whalley (1977) the present model formulates a utility function for the government which it is
assumed to maximize subject to its budget constraint. The corresponding expenditure function is used to
calculate the government revenue required to achieve the same level of utility at any set of prices. When
simulating the effects of tax changes in the balanced budget incidence simulations, we give the
government enough revenue so that its utility is the same across all revised-case simulations. Finally,
since the prices are different between the initial and the revised-case equilibrium, we cannot simply
compare the revenues in both equilibria. Instead of using a Laspeyres price index or some other index to
correct for relative price changes, we use the expenditure function in order to obtain the real change in
government revenue.
In order to calculate the monetary value of the change in social welfare (dSW ), we first define the g
social welfare function as: 
g is the degree of inequality aversion. The exercise is repeated for different degrees of inequality aversion
in order to test the sensitivity of the results to this parameter. A value of g = 0 means that the social
welfare function gives an equal weight to the welfare of individuals belonging to different consumerj
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groups. As the value of g increases, society has a higher degree of inequality aversion. The welfare of an
individual belonging to consumer group i is measured by means of his equivalent income EI. It is defined
i
here as that level of income which, at the reference price vector and the reference levels of congestion,
emissions and accidents, allows one to reach the same level of utility as can be attained under the new
price vector and level of congestion, emissions and accidents. To obtain a monetary measure of the social
value of the policy reforms, we use the concept of the social equivalent gain, denoted by SG . It is defined g
as the increase in each individual’s original equivalent income which would produce a social welfare level
equal to the one obtained in the post-reform equilibrium [King (1983)].
The marginal cost of public funds of instrument g is then defined as:
Note that the MCF calculations say nothing about the social value of the change in government
spending. This is because of the purpose of the MCF exercises. On the one hand, when the MCF
calculations are used in cost-benefit analyses, the purpose is to compare the social welfare loss with the
amount of revenue collected for the government. If the MCF is larger than one, the calculations indicate
that the incremental government spending must generate more than an ECU of social value per ECU of
costs in order to be socially worthwhile. It is the benefit side of the analysis which takes into account the
utility that the increase in government spending provides to the consumers. On the other hand, the tax
reform exercises aim to compare the MCF of two tax instruments in order to assess the possibility of
revenue neutral tax reforms. The revenue generated by one instrument is assumed to be returned through
the second instrument.
For the analysis of the results it will prove useful to decompose the marginal cost of public funds
of each instrument g into three terms. 
The first term (MCF ) is defined as the marginal cost of funds when emissions of air pollutants and g
A
accidents are assumed to remain at their reference level. However, given the way in which congestion is
modelled, this term does take into account the welfare effect of the changes in speed. The second term
(MCF ) presents the marginal welfare impact associated with the change in emissions. Finally, the last g
B
term (MCF ) is the marginal welfare impact of the change in accidents caused by the tax reform.  g
C
The findings for the model with externalities are contrasted with the MCF calculations for the
same model without externalities. In these calculations, the second and third term of MCF  drop out and g
the first term does not include the welfare effects of the change in speed since these are assumed to be
constant. The MCF calculated by the model without externalities is referred to by the symbol MCF  in the
*
rest of the paper.
The AGE model is used to compute the MCF and its components for four alternative As regards the other policy instruments, the following assumptions are made. Unless the
9
instruments are changed as described for the different balanced budget exercises, it is assumed that:
- the VAT rate, the indirect tax rate, the labour income tax rate and the capital income tax rate remain
constant at the level of the initial equilibrium;
- the lump sum transfer, the total government subsidies, the international government transfers and the
government deficit are constant in real terms (measured by the consumer price Laspeyres index).
- 23 -
instruments. These instruments are used to finance a real increase in separable government expenditures
of approximately 0.2%. Table 7 provides an overview of the simulations. A distinction is made between
the model without externalities and the model with externalities. 
Table 7: The Balanced Budget Incidence Simulations








   Quintile 1 17 ECU/day/person
   Quintile 2 14 ECU/day/person
   Quintile 3 10 ECU/day/person
   Quintile 4 8 ECU/day/person
   Quintile 5 6 ECU/day/person




   Quintile 1 7%
   Quintile 2 18.18%
   Quintile 3 29.28%
   Quintile 4 39.80%
   Quintile 5 54.37%




0 ECU/vkm +0.0024 ECU/vkm +0.0023 ECU/vkm
Excise on fuel for
road transport 
   Gasoline
   Diesel
   LPG
(as % of producer
price)
125.634% all fuels: all fuels:
85.237% +2.951 percentage +2.910 percentage
0.000% points points
We consider the following instruments :
9
1. a lump sum tax: this instrument consists of a reduction in the lump sum transfer received by
the individuals. The share of the lump sum transfer in generalized income ranges from 34.7% for
the poorest quintile to 5.8% for the richest quintile in the initial equilibrium. The percentage- 24 -
reduction in the real lump sum transfer is assumed to be the same for all quintiles.
2. an increase in the tax rate on labour income: the income tax rate is increased by the same
rate for all quintiles.
In addition to these two more conventional revenue generating tax instruments we consider two
instruments aimed specifically at the transport sector:
3. an increase in the fuel tax: in this revised-case simulation the excise on the fuels used by road
transport is raised. When expressed as percentage of the producer price, the excise is increased
by the same number of percentage points for all fuel types. The fact that the excise, rather than
the VAT rate, rises, makes that the use of fuel for road transport both by the consumers and the
domestic producers is taxed. Foreign road transport users are not subject to this tax. The tax on
fuel used by rail transport and inland navigation is assumed to remain a constant percentage of
the producer prices.
4. peak road pricing: this instrument consists of the introduction of a tax per vkm driven by
motorized peak road transport. All vehicle types driving on Belgian roads during the peak period
are subject to this tax, regardless of their country of origin.
1. The AGE Model without Externalities
Table 8 summarizes the results of the balanced budget incidence exercises for the model without
externalities. In the case of a utilitarian social welfare function (g = 0), the MCF  of all policy instruments
*
is larger than one. The MCF  of the lump sum tax is higher than 1 and it is also higher than the MCF  of
*                                  *
the fuel tax. This can be explained as follows. First of all, the reduction in the lump sum transfer reduces
the consumption of taxed goods by the consumers, which reduces the tax revenues from this source.
Secondly, there is a reduction in the tax income from the labour income tax. The total labour supply
increases. However, the effect of this on tax revenue is offset by the decrease in the wage rate, but also by
the shift from heavily taxed labour (supplied by the highest quintiles) to less heavily taxed labour
(supplied by the lower quintiles). The proportionate increase in the labour supply is the highest for the
poorer quintiles. Since the share of the lump sum transfer in generalized income is higher for these
quintiles than for the richer quintiles, their generalized income is reduced by a larger percentage.
Moreover, their income elasticity of labour supply is higher. There is a decrease in the real wage rate,
which offsets the effect of a lower lump sum transfer on labour supply in the case of the richest quintile,
but not for the other quintiles. The labour supply of the richest quintile decreases slightly. The shift from
heavily to less heavily taxed labour explains the relatively high MCF  of the lump sum tax. 
*
The increase in the labour income tax leads to an increase in the total labour supply. This is due
to the higher labour supply of the first three quintiles, while that of the two richest quintiles falls. The
smaller share of highly productive and heavily taxed labour and the larger share of the less productive and
less heavily taxed labour explains the high MCF  of the labour income tax when g = 0.
*
The MCF  of peak road pricing and the fuel tax are lower than that of the labour income tax,
*
despite the fact that these taxes have a relatively narrow tax base. For the fuel tax the MCF  is even lower
*
than that of the lump sum tax. This is because both measures increase labour supply even though at thej
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same time more time is spent in leisure. This is made possible by the fact that less time is devoted to
transport. Moreover, there is a shift from relatively lowly taxed labour (supplied by the first two
quintiles) to relatively highly taxed labour. The MCF  is higher for peak road pricing than for the fuel tax
*
because the former instrument has a narrower tax base than the latter.
For g = 0 the MCF  is the lowest for the fuel tax, followed by the lump sum tax, peak road
*
pricing and the labour income tax. This ranking changes for higher degrees of inequality aversion. A
higher degree of inequality aversion leads to a higher MCF  in the case of the lump sum tax and to a
*
lower value of the MCF  in the case of the other instruments. The reason for this becomes clear when we
*
look at the value of the equivalent gain per 1000 persons for each of the quintiles (EG ). In the case of the
*
lump sum transfer the welfare loss per 1000 persons is the highest for the lower quintiles, while the
opposite is the case for the other policy instruments. A higher degree of inequality aversion implies that
more weight is given to the welfare impacts on the lower quintiles. Therefore, e.g., for a high inequality
aversion (g = 1.5) the labour income tax has the lowest MCF , followed by the fuel tax, peak road pricing
*
and the lump sum tax.
In order to measure the impact of the policy reforms on the inequality, we use a scalar measure of
inequality defined over the distribution of equivalent incomes. Based on Kolm (1969) and Atkinson
(1970) we first define the equally distributed equivalent level of equivalent income (EI ) as that level of E
equivalent income which, if shared equally by all individuals, would produce the same level of social
welfare as that generated by the actual distribution of equivalent income:
The Atkinson-Kolm index of inequality is then defined as:
where  is the mean level of equivalent income. INEQ lies between zero and one. When INEQ equals 0
there is complete equality. A higher value of INEQ means a higher degree of inequality. Table 8 gives the
inequality index in the reference equilibrium (INEQ ) and the percentage change in the index with
*,ref
respect to INEQ  for each of the instruments and for different degrees of inequality aversion. The lump
*,ref
sum transfer increases inequality and more so for higher degrees of inequality aversion. The three other
instruments reduce inequality, the labour income tax having the largest impact. The impact also rises with
the degree of inequality aversion.
2. The AGE Model with Externalities           
The ranking of the policy instruments in terms of their MCF changes significantly when the
effect on the externalities is accounted for. Table 9 presents the MCF results for this case. Peak road
pricing now has the lowest MCF, followed by the excise on fuel for road transport. In these two cases- 26 -
Table 8: Balanced Budget Incidence Simulations: The AGE Model without Externalities
Lump sum tax Labour income tax Peak road pricing Fuel tax
MCF
*
   g = 0 1.150 1.178 1.164 1.141
   g = 0.25 1.174 1.141 1.143 1.122
   g = 0.5 1.198 1.105 1.122 1.103




   g = 0 [2] [4] [3] [1]
   g = 0.25 [4] [3] [2] [1]
   g = 0.5 [4] [2] [3] [1]
   g = 1.5 [4] [1] [3] [2]
EG  
* a
   Quintile 1 -24.5 (-0.0495%) -8.1 (-0.0165%) -7.1 (-0.0143%) -7.6 (-0.0153%)
   Quintile 2 -20.2 (-0.0327%) -8.0 (-0.0129%) -11.5 (-0.0186%) -11.5 (-0.0187%)
   Quintile 3 -14.8 (-0.0203%) -9.0 (-0.0123%) -13.7 (-0.0187%) -13.3 (-0.0182%)
   Quintile 4 -11.7 (-0.0139%) -13.3 (-0.0159%) -16.0 (-0.0191%) -15.5 (-0.0185%)
   Quintile 5 -10.3 (-0.0094%) -28.2 (-0.0258%) -20.1 (-0.0184%) -19.5 (-0.0178%)
Percentage change




   g = 0.25 0.0843% -0.0366% -0.0045% -0.0018%
   g = 0.5 0.0854% -0.0358% -0.0048% -0.0020%
   g = 1.5 0.0893% -0.0323% -0.0058% -0.0027%
The values are expressed in 10  ECU/1000 persons/ day. The figures within brackets give the EG  as % of EI
a           -3                    *        ref- 27 -
 the value of the MCF is below one for all degrees of inequality aversion. E.g., for g = 0 the MCF of peak
road pricing equals 0.681. This means that the increase in government spending financed with this
instrument would still be welfare improving with a social benefit of only 69% of non-tax costs. The MCF
of the lump sum tax and the labour income tax is higher than one in most cases. Though the degree of
inequality aversion affects the value of the MCF, it changes the ranking only for the labour income tax
and the lump sum tax. The ranking of the instruments according to the value of the MCF is determined
completely by the MCF . This is the case for all values of g considered in the study. Including the effects
A
on air pollution and accidents leaves the ranking unaltered.
Table 9: Balanced Budget Incidence Exercises: The MCF in the AGE Model with Externalities 
Lump sum tax Labour income Peak road pricing Fuel tax
tax
MCF
  g = 0 1.130 1.138 0.681 0.798
  g = 0.25 1.154 1.102 0.669 0.783
  g = 0.5 1.178 1.067 0.657 0.768
  g = 1.5 1.280 0.937 0.606 0.707
MCF
A
  g = 0 1.137 1.158 0.775 0.948
  g = 0.25 1.160 1.121 0.763 0.933
  g = 0.5 1.185 1.086 0.751 0.918
  g = 1.5 1.286 0.956 0.700 0.856
MCF
B
all values of g  -0.002 -0.015 -0.075 -0.118
MCF
C




  g = 0 [3] [4] [1] [2]
  g = 0.25 [4] [3] [1] [2]
  g = 0.5 [4] [3] [1] [2]
  g = 1.5 [4] [3] [1] [2]
For all policy instruments the MCF is lower than the MCF . The reason for this is that they have
*
an impact on the level of the externalities. In order to explain the welfare impact of the changed level of
the externalities, it is useful to decompose the marginal externality impact into three components. They
are summarized in Figure 1. The first two components are the activity and the composition effect [see,
e.g., Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994)]. The activity effect consists of the impact on the level of
economic activity by the different economic agents. A reduction in the level of economic activity can be
expected to lead to a lower use of externality generating goods and therefore to reduce the level of theMarginal externality impact
Activity effect
Composition effect Gross composition effect
Effect of switch from relatively high
   to relatively low externality generating
   activities
Effect of switch from private to public





externalities. The composition effect refers to the effect of the change in the composition of the economic
activity. The composition may change because of the switch in private 
and public sectors between activities with different impacts on the externalities. Secondly, there is the
effect of the switch from private to public consumption, which reduces the externality level if public
consumption generates less externalities than private consumption. Adding these two effects gives the
gross composition effect. Bovenberg & van der Ploeg (1994) include the public abatement effect as the
second determinant of the composition effect. However, since the present version the AGE model does
not include the possibility of public abatement, this effect is zero in our case. The third determinant of the
composition effect is the feedback effect. It is associated with the impact on the behaviour of the
economic agents induced by the change in the level of the externality. In our model the feedback effect is
present only for congestion, since this is the only externality which provides a non-separable contribution
to the consumers’ welfare and has an impact on the productivity of inputs at the production side of the
economy. The feedback effect can be expected to counteract the first two components of the composition
effect. This is because a decrease in the level of congestion will induce the economic agents to use more
transport, which increases the level of congestion again. The feedback effect is absent in models where
the level of the externality does not influence the behaviour of the economic agents. This explains why it
was not included in, e.g., Bovenberg & van der Ploeg (1994). 
The final component of the marginal externality impact is related to the impact of the policy
change on the marginal utility of a change in the different externalities. We term this the valuation effect.
In the model the marginal utility of a time saving in transport is affected by the policy changes and
therefore influences the value of the MCF. This effect is not present in the case of air pollution and
accidents, since the model assumes that the marginal utility of a change in emissions and accidents
remains constant in all simulations.
Figure 1:  The Components of the Marginal Externality Impact- 29 -
The next section discusses the results for the lump sum tax and the labour income tax. First, we
discuss the determinants of the different components of the MCF. Then we turn to the distributional
impacts of the two policies. Afterwards, the results for the two other instruments are presented.
 a.  The Lump Sum Tax and the Labour Income Tax
(1) MCF
A
The MCF  of the lump sum tax and the labour income tax is lower than the MCF  for all degrees
A                              *
of inequality aversion considered in the model. This is because the instruments have an impact on the
level of congestion. Tables 10 and 11 summarize the effect of the four policy instruments on freight and
passenger transport in Belgium for the model with externalities. Table 12 presents the resulting changes
in the road traffic flow and car speed in the peak and off-peak period.
The activity effect is the main reason for the reduced congestion level caused by the labour
income tax and the lump sum tax. In the case of the labour income tax the activity level of the economy is
reduced because public consumption rises less than private consumption falls. This can be explained as
follows. The increase in the labour income tax rate reduces the real after tax wage rate, which leads to a
lower real generalised income for all quintiles. This lowers the consumer demand for all goods, except
nonmotorized transport. Since the percentage reduction in the real wage rate is the highest for the richer
quintiles, the proportional reduction in real generalized income and therefore in consumption is the
highest for them. The activity effect is also present at the production side of the economy. The fall in
consumer demand leads to lower production levels and to a reduction in the total number of tkm
transported in Belgium by the domestic production sectors. Moreover, higher production prices of the 
domestic production sectors increase (due to the increase in the wage rate), increase the share of imports
in the Armington composite and reduce the demand for exports. Both effects strengthen the negative
impact on the demand for domestic products. The other components of the marginal externality impact
are less important. As regards the composition effect, the switch from private to public consumption
lowers the congestion level, since public consumption generates no externalities. This effect acts in the
same direction for all policy instruments. At the consumer’s side there is a small shift from car to non-car
transport, which also results in a lower congestion level. However, the feedback effect mitigates to some
extent the previous effects. The increase in speed causes the consumers to reduce their consumption of
road transport by less than if speed had remained constant. The same phenomenon is present at the
production side of the economy. In the domestic production sectors, the increase in speed of road freight
transport causes the share of this mode in the total number of tkm to rise at the expense of rail and inland
navigation. The share of road freight transport of imports and transit transport increases because of the
same reason. Moreover, for business transport there is a switch from the rail to the car mode. Still, the
activity effect being dominant, the overall impact is that the congestion level is lower than in the initial
equilibrium. This results in higher speeds both in the peak and in the off-peak period.
Note that the increase in speeds allows to finance the increase in real government spending by - 30 -
Table 10:  Freight transport in Belgium - The AGE Model with Externalities
Initial % change w.r.t. initial equilibrium
equilibrium 
(tkm) Lump sum Labour Peak road Fuel tax




Road 87311 0.013%  0.001% -0.005% -0.117%
   Peak 16257 0.014%  0.002% -0.055% -0.102%
   Off-peak 71054 0.013% 0.001%  0.006% -0.120%
Inland navigation 8069 0.005% -0.002% 0.015% 0.307%
Freight rail 16036 -0.007% -0.039% 0.007% 0.149%
Total 111416 0.009% -0.005% -0.002% -0.048%
Import related freight
transport in Belgium
Road 13784 0.007% 0.017% -0.016%  0.060%
   Peak 2566 0.007% 0.017% -0.072% 0.068%
   Off-peak 11217 0.007% 0.016% -0.003%  0.058%
Inland navigation 5614 0.018% 0.006% 0.055% 0.028%
Freight rail 4792 0.006% -0.037% 0.051% -0.186%
Total 24189 0.009% 0.004% 0.014% 0.004%
Transit freight transport
in Belgium
Road 9044 0.003% 0.000% -0.047% 0.017%
   Peak 1684 0.003% 0.001% -0.099%  0.025%
   Off-peak 7360 0.003% 0.000% -0.035% 0.015%
Inland navigation 1141 0.010% -0.002% -0.012%  0.012%
Freight rail 2060 0.003% -0.025% -0.021% -0.100%
Total 12245 0.003% -0.004% -0.039% -0.003%
Total freight transport
in Belgium
Road 110138 0.011% 0.003% -0.010% -0.084%
   Peak 20508 0.012% 0.004% -0.061% -0.071%
   Off-peak 89631 0.011% 0.003%  0.002% -0.087%
Inland navigation 14824 0.010%  0.001% 0.028% 0.179%
Freight rail 22888 -0.004% -0.037% 0.014% 0.057%
Total 147850 0.009% -0.003% -0.003% -0.036%- 31 -
Table 11:  Passenger transport in Belgium - The AGE Model without Externalities
Initial % change w.r.t. initial equilibrium
equilibrium 
(pkm) Lump sum Labour Peak road Fuel tax
tax income tax pricing
Non-Business
Car
   Peak 69433 -0.015% -0.015% -0.475% -0.137%
   Off-peak 122823 -0.028% -0.032%  0.012% -0.245%
Bus, tram, metro
   Peak 11614 -0.002% -0.005% 0.297% 0.089%
   Off-peak 11827 -0.001% -0.013% 0.025% 0.046%
Rail
   Peak 7702 -0.012% -0.033% 0.076% 0.039%
   Off-peak 9261 -0.012% -0.031% 0.022% 0.067%
Non-motorized
   Peak 8949 0.000% 0.008% 0.165% 0.077%
   Off-peak 12937 0.004% 0.014% 0.042% 0.124%
Business
Car
   Peak 10863 0.017%  0.001% -0.043% -0.040%
   Off-peak 19131 0.016% 0.000% 0.001% -0.051%
Rail
   Peak 477 0.017% -0.005% 0.049% -0.026%
   Off-peak 885 0.017% -0.004%  0.030% -0.022%
Table 12:  Road Traffic Flow and Speed - The AGE Model with Externalities
Initial % change w.r.t. initial equilibrium
equilibrium 
Lump sum Labour Peak road Fuel tax
tax income tax pricing
Road traffic flow
(mio PCU/h)
   Peak 15.25 -0.008% -0.011% -0.373% -0.113%
   Off-peak 9.00 -0.013% -0.021% 0.010% -0.184%
Car speed (km/h)
   Peak 51.77 0.010% 0.014% 0.474% 0.143%
   Off-peak 77.44 0.006% 0.009% -0.004% 0.077%- 32 -
Table 13: The Marginal Utility of a Time Saving in Transport
% change w.r.t. initial equilibrium
Lump sum Labour Peak road Fuel tax
tax income tax pricing
Car
   Peak
        Quintile 1 -0.026% -0.003% 0.018% -0.018%
        Quintile 2 -0.023% -0.014% -0.200% -0.102%
        Quintile 3 -0.022% -0.026% -0.231% -0.108%
        Quintile 4 -0.021% -0.037% -0.173% -0.085%
        Quintile 5 -0.019% -0.059% -0.115% -0.062%
   Off-peak
        Quintile 1 -0.025% -0.003% -0.050% -0.041%
        Quintile 2 -0.027% -0.016% -0.071% -0.162%
        Quintile 3 -0.026% -0.030% -0.064% -0.167%
        Quintile 4 -0.025% -0.044% -0.055% -0.133%
        Quintile 5 -0.022% -0.069% -0.046% -0.098%
Bus, tram, metro
   Peak
        Quintile 1 -0.024% -0.002% -0.121% -0.073%
        Quintile 2 -0.020% -0.014% -0.362% -0.162%
        Quintile 3 -0.022% -0.031% -0.514% -0.212%
        Quintile 4 -0.023% -0.043% -0.358% -0.152%
        Quintile 5 -0.023% -0.068% -0.268% -0.117%
   Off-peak
        Quintile 1 -0.021% 0.002% -0.080% -0.134%
        Quintile 2 -0.022% -0.011% -0.109% -0.243%
        Quintile 3 -0.028% -0.033% -0.114% -0.294%
        Quintile 4 -0.029% -0.051% -0.089% -0.222%
        Quintile 5 -0.029% -0.083% -0.070% -0.175%
a smaller rise in the labour income tax rate than in the model without externalities [see Table 7]. This is a
second reason why the MCF  is lower than the MCF . It is explained by the feedback effect which causes
A          *
highly taxed road transport to be discouraged less than if speed had not changed. Moreover, the feedback
effect causes the domestic production to fall less than in the absence of this effect. Given that the capital
stock is fixed, the price of capital services provided by the stock falls less and the tax revenue from this
source is reduced by less. The need for lower tax increases when the feedback effect is modelled, is also
observed for the other policy instruments, as becomes clear from Table 7. 
The lump sum tax affects the level of congestion less, which accounts for a smaller difference
between the MCF  and the MCF  for this instrument. Here also, the activity effect is the main determinant
A      *
of this result. The lower lump sum transfer reduces generalized income, an effect which is reinforced by
the lower real after-tax wage rate. On average, real generalized income falls less than in the case of the
labour income tax. However, the distribution over the quintiles is different: since the lump sum transfer
accounts for a larger share of generalized income of the poorer quintiles, the percentage reduction of- 33 -
generalized income is larger for them. The reduction in generalized income lowers consumer demand for
all goods, except nonmotorized transport, and reduces the congestion level. Consumption of the poorer
quintiles is reduced proportionally more than that of the richer quintiles. However, the activity effect at
the consumer side is partly offset by an opposite activity effect at the domestic production side. The lower
wage rate and the increase in speed allow domestic production sectors to produce more cheaply. As a
result, domestic demand for domestically produced goods increases at the expense of imports and exports
rise. The demand for all inputs, including transport, increases which causes a rise in the level of
congestion. The total activity effect leads to a lower level of congestion and higher speeds for road
transport. The composition effect is similar to that of the labour income tax.
For both instruments the valuation effect reduces the welfare impact of the higher speeds. Table
13 shows that the lump sum tax and the labour income tax cause the marginal utility of a time saving
(mu ) in transport to be slightly lower in the new equilibrium. As a result, the welfare gain of the lower T
i
congestion levels is lower than if the mu  had remained constant. However, the valuation effect is T
i
relatively small. For peak car transport, the reduction in the mu  ranges from -0.019% to -0.026% in the T
i
case of the lump sum tax and -0.003% to -0.059% in the case of the labour income tax. For the last
instrument the mu  is reduced proportionally less for the lower than for the higher quintiles. This pattern T
i
is observed for all transport modes and is closely related to the change in the after-tax wage rate. The
same is true for the lump sum tax, where the proportionate change in the mu  is of the same order of T
i
magnitude for all quintiles, as is the proportionate change in the after-tax wage rate.
(2) MCF  and MCF
B    C
The first of the two other components of the MCF is the MCF , which reflects the additional
B
welfare gain associated with the change in emissions. Table 14 presents the percentage change in the
emission levels caused by the four policy instruments. The lump sum tax and the labour income tax both
lead to lower air pollutant emissions. The labour income tax has a larger impact on transport emissions
than the lump sum tax. This can be explained as the result of the combined activity and composition
effects which were described above. The non-transport related emissions consist of the emissions caused
by the use of energy for non-transport purposes by the residential (consumer) and the production sectors.
Table 15 summarizes the change in non-transport energy use w.r.t. the initial equilibrium. The activity
effect is the main determinant of the change in non-transport energy in the case of the lump sum tax and
the labour income tax and explains why the former reduces emissions more than the latter. The
composition effect is relatively less important. The switch from private to public consumption reduces
emissions since public consumption does not cause air pollution. On the consumer side the share of solid
fuels rises. Since these are associated with higher air pollution costs in the residential sector, this
increases air pollution costs. On the producer side the opposite phenomenon is observed: the input of
solid fuels is reduced more than that of other fuels. Note that the feedback effect and the valuation effect
are absent. 
Table 14: The Effects of the Policy Reforms on the Emissions of Air Pollutants- 34 -
% change w.r.t. the initial equilibrium
Emissions Initial Lump sum tax Labour Peak road Fuel tax
equilibrium income tax pricing
(ton/day)
Transport 
   NO 613 -0.006% -0.014% -0.074% -0.128% x
   SO 45 -0.001% -0.009% -0.083% -0.118% x
   HC 430 -0.016% -0.022% -0.110% -0.163%
   CO 1747 -0.018% -0.024% -0.119% -0.170%
   CO 55976 -0.008% -0.015% -0.098% -0.140% 2
   PM 42 -0.000% -0.008% -0.080% -0.121% 2.5
Non-transport 
   NO 380 0.000% -0.011% 0.001% -0.007% x
   SO 869 0.000% -0.010% -0.006% -0.017% x
   HC 29 -0.008% -0.014% -0.002% -0.012%
   CO 2 0.014% 0.002% 0.017% 0.011%
   CO 230890 -0.002% -0.011% -0.001% -0.008% 2
   PM 1 0.014% 0.002% 0.017% 0.011% 2.5
   PM 12 -0.001% -0.014% 0.005% 0.000% 10
Total emissions
   NO 992 -0.004% -0.013% -0.045% -0.082% x
   SO 914 0.000% -0.010% -0.010% -0.022% x
   HC 459 -0.015% -0.022% -0.103% -0.154%
   CO 1749 -0.018% -0.024% -0.119% -0.170%
   CO 286866 -0.003% -0.012% -0.020% -0.034% 2
   PM 43 0.000% -0.008% -0.079% -0.119% 2.5
   PM 12 -0.001% -0.014% 0.005% 0.000% 10
The MCF  reflects the change in the external transport accident costs. The activity effect of the
C
labour income tax reduces the number of transport km and hence the total accident costs. The switch from
private to public consumption strengthens this effect. But at the consumers’ side there is a shift from car
to non-car transport and especially to non-motorized transport which has relatively high external accident
costs. Moreover, at the producer side the share of road transport increases, which also leads to higher
accident costs. The overall impact of the activity and the composition effect is a reduction in the accident
costs. Note that the composition effect does not include a feedback effect in the case of accidents. In the
case of the lump sum tax, the composition effect acts in the same direction as for the labour income tax.
However, the activity effect reduces transport demand by the consumers but increases the input of
transport in the production sectors.- 35 -
Table 15:  The Effect of the Policy Reforms on the Domestic Demand for Non-Transport
Energy
% change w.r.t. the initial equilibrium
Initial Lump sum Labour Peak road Fuel tax
equilibrium tax income tax pricing
Consumer demand
   Electricity (MWh/day) 41 -0.042% -0.058% -0.021% -0.018%
   Solid fuels (t/day) 2 -0.022% -0.023% -0.010% -0.024%
   Petrol products (t/day) 9 -0.024% -0.026% -0.019% -0.022%
   Gas (toe/day) 7 -0.026% -0.025% -0.019% -0.017%
Input by the domestic
production sectors
   Electricity (MWh/day) 486 -0.015% -0.008% -0.015% -0.009%
   Solid fuels (t/day) 58 0.002% -0.012% 0.008% -0.002%
   Petrol products (t/day) 98 0.001% -0.002% -0.007% -0.014%
   Gas (toe/day) 21 0.009% -0.003% 0.013% 0.007%
(3) The Distributional Impacts of the Lump sum Tax and the Labour Income Tax
Table 16 gives more information on the distributional impacts of the policies. They can be
compared with the results for the model without externalities, which were presented in Table 8. It is clear
that including the externalities in the analysis does not greatly affect the instruments’ distributional
impacts. The lump sum tax continues to affect mainly the lower quintiles, while the labour income tax
mainly affects the higher quintiles. As a result, the MCF of the lump sum transfer increases with the
degree of inequality aversion, while the opposite is true for the labour income tax [see Table 9]. The value
of the MCF  and the MCF  is not affected by the degree of inequality aversion. This is because the
B      C
marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in emissions and accidents is assumed to be identical for all
individuals (across the quintiles).
Table 17 presents the impact of the four policy measures on the inequality index. INEQ
incorporates the welfare effects of the change in all externalities, while INEQ  includes only the effect on
A
congestion. The effect of the lump sum tax and the labour income tax on the inequality indices is similar
to the effect in the model without externalities. The lump sum tax increases inequality, while the opposite
is true for the labour income tax. When account is taken only of the impact on the congestion level,
inequality is increased more (by the lump sum tax) or reduced less (by the labour income tax) than in the
model without externalities. The opposite is observed when the effect on the other externalities is
included as well. This indicates that the reduced congestion leads to a higher relative increase in welfare
for the individuals belonging to the higher quintiles, while the reverse is true for air pollution and
accidents.- 36 -
 b.  Peak Road Pricing and the Fuel Tax
(1) MCF
A
The fact that peak road pricing is a very effective instrument to tackle the congestion problem is
reflected in the large difference between the MCF  and the MCF  for this instrument [see Tables 10 and
A      *
11]. It is because of this characteristic that peak road pricing becomes the best instrument to finance the
increase in government expenditures when externalities are taken into account. This is the case not only
when only efficiency aspects are considered (i.e., for g = 0) but also for higher degrees of inequality
aversion. The gross composition effect is the main explanation for the substantial difference between the
MCF  and the MCF . Table 11 shows that the imposition of a tax on peak road transport induces the
A      *
consumers and the domestic production sectors to switch from peak car to off-peak car transport, and to
the other transport modes. At the consumer side, the percentage changes are larger for the poorer than for
the richer quintiles. This is because the price elasticities are higher for the poorer quintiles. The
proportional changes are smaller for business than for non-business transport, due to the lower price
sensitivity of the former category. As regards freight transport, Table 10 shows that there is a switch from
peak to off-peak road freight transport and from road freight transport to inland navigation and rail. The
effect on transit transport is larger than that on domestic and import related transport given the higher
price sensitivity of this type of transport. The gross composition effect is offset to some extent by the
feedback effect. E.g., because of the higher speeds the consumer demand for peak car pkm is reduced by
0.48% compared to 0.64% in the model without externalities (which assumes constant speed).
The activity effect is of relatively small importance. On the consumer side it reinforces the
composition effect. The real after tax wage falls because the tax on peak road transport acts as an implicit
tax on labour income. Moreover, the input of transport in the production sectors is reduced. This lowers
the productivity of the other inputs in the production process. Part of the burden will be borne by labour.
The lower real after tax wage rate leads to a reduction in real generalized income. The proportional
reduction is higher for the richest quintiles, because time income accounts for a larger share of their
generalized income compared to the poorer quintiles. Consumer demand for all goods is reduced, and the
proportional decrease is higher for the richer quintiles. However, the domestic production sector becomes
more competitive, thanks to the lower wage rate and the increase in transport speed, such that an opposite
activity effect is observed on the production side. 
The welfare gain of the reduction in the congestion level is mitigated by a change in the marginal
utility of a time saving (mu ) [see Table 13]. The impact is larger than for the lump sum tax and the T
i
labour income tax. The most pronounced changes are observed for peak car and peak bus, tram and metro
transport which are affected the most by the policy reform. The percentage change in mu  for peak car T
i
transport ranges from -0.115% (for quintile 5) to -0.231% (for quintile 3)(quintile 1 has a small positive
change), while for peak bus, tram and metro transport it ranges from -0.12% (for quintile 5) to -0.514%
(for quintile 3). For individuals belonging to the second to fifth quintile the mu  for peak car transport is T
i
related negatively to its consumer price, its speed and the individuals’ demand for the good. It is related
positively to the wage rate. The mu  of the poorer quintiles is more sensitive to   T
i- 37 -
Table 16: Balanced Budget Incidence Exercises: The Distribution of the Welfare Impact among the Quintiles - The AGE Model with Externalities
a
Lump sum tax Labour income tax Peak road pricing Fuel tax
EG 
 Quintile 1 -24.3 (-0.0491%) -7.8 (-0.0157%) -3.2 (-0.0066%) -4.3 (-0.0087%)
 Quintile 2 -20.0 (-0.0324%) -7.5 (-0.0123%) -6.6 (-0.0107%) -7.8 (-0.0126%)
 Quintile 3 -14.6 (-0.0200%) -8.6 (-0.0117%) -8.9 (-0.0121%) -9.6 (-0.0131%)
 Quintile 4 -11.4 (-0.0136%) -12.8 (-0.0153%) -9.9 (-0.0118%) -11.2 (-0.0133%)
 Quintile 5   -9.9 (-0.0091%) -27.6 (-0.0252%) -11.1 (-0.0101%) -13.8 (-0.0126%)
EG
A
   Quintile 1 -24.4 (-0.0493%) -8.0 (-0.0162%) -4.5 (-0.0090%) -6.2 (-0.0125%)
   Quintile 2 -20.1 (-0.0325%) -7.8 (-0.0126%) -7.9 (-0.0127%) -9.7 (-0.0157%)
   Quintile 3 -14.7 (-0.0201%) -8.8 (-0.0120%) -10.1 (-0.0138%) -11.5 (-0.0157%)
   Quintile 4 -11.5 (-0.0137%) -13.1 (-0.0156%) -11.1 (-0.0132%) -13.1 (-0.0156%)
   Quintile 5 -10.0 (-0.0091%) -27.8 (-0.0254%) -12.3 (-0.0112%) -15.7 (-0.0143%)
EG
B
   Quintile 1 0.02 (0.00005%) 0.20 (0.0004%) 0.96 (0.0019%) 1.52 (0.0031%)
   Quintile 2 0.02 (0.00004%) 0.20 (0.0003%) 0.96 (0.0016%) 1.52 (0.0025%)
   Quintile 3 0.02 (0.00003%) 0.20 (0.0003%) 0.96 (0.0013%) 1.52 (0.0021%)
   Quintile 4 0.02 (0.00003%) 0.20 (0.0002%) 0.96 (0.0011%) 1.52 (0.0018%)
   Quintile 5 0.02 (0.00002%) 0.20 (0.0002%) 0.96 (0.0009%) 1.52 (0.0014%)
EG
C
   Quintile 1 0.06 (0.00012%) 0.05 (0.00010%) 0.25 (0.0005%) 0.40 (0.0008%)
   Quintile 2 0.06 (0.00010%) 0.05 (0.00008%) 0.25 (0.0004%) 0.40 (0.0007%)
   Quintile 3 0.06 (0.00008%) 0.05 (0.00007%) 0.25 (0.0004%) 0.40 (0.0006%)
   Quintile 4 0.06 (0.00007%) 0.05 (0.00006%) 0.25 (0.0003%) 0.40 (0.0005%)
   Quintile 5 0.06 (0.00005%) 0.05 (0.00004%) 0.25 (0.0002%) 0.40 (0.0004%)
  All values are expressed in 10  ECU/1000 persons/day. The figures within brackets give the EG as % of EI
a            -3                          ref- 38 -
Table 17:  The Effect of the Policy Measures on the Inequality Index - 
The AGE Model with Externalities




   Lump sum transfer 0.0842% 0.0853% 0.0892%
   Labour income tax -0.0369% -0.0361% -0.0327%
   Peak road pricing -0.0021% -0.0024% -0.0039%
   Fuel tax -0.0043% -0.0045% -0.0056%
Percentage change of
INEQ  w.r.t. INEQ
A    A,ref
   Lump sum transfer 0.0844% 0.0855% 0.0894%
   Labour income tax -0.0363% -0.0355% -0.0320%
   Peak road pricing 0.0010% 0.0006% -0.0008%
   Fuel tax 0.0005% 0.0003% -0.0007%
changes in the wage rate and the consumer price than that of the higher quintiles. This explains why the
change in the mu  for peak car transport is smaller for the richer quintiles. For the first quintile its value T
i
increases. This is because for this quintile mu  is positively related to the consumer price. The mu  for T                   T
i                  i
bus, tram and metro transport is related positively to the wage rate and the consumer price, and negatively
to speed and the individual’s consumption of the good. The different magnitude of the effect on the muT
i
for peak bus, tram and metro transport for the different quintiles is mainly explained by differences in the
sensitivity of this variable to changes in the wage rate and the consumer price across the quintiles.
The fuel tax performs worse than peak road pricing in tackling the congestion problem. This
explains why its ranking in terms of the MCF changes from the first place in the modl without
externalities to the second place when the externalities are taken into account. The composition effect is
to blame for this. Table 11 shows that the fuel tax lowers total car pkm more than peak road pricing.
However, this reduction takes place both in the peak and in the off-peak period. Moreover, the percentage
reduction is larger in the latter period, even though the congestion problem is much less stringent in this
period. In Table 10 a similar impact is observed for freight transport by the domestic production sectors.
Note that the share of the road mode increases for import related and transit transport, since these are
assumed not to be subject to the fuel tax but can benefit from the higher speeds on Belgian roads.
 Also for the fuel tax the welfare impact of the lower traffic levels is mitigated by the reduction in
the mu  marginal utility of a time saving (see Table 13). The reduction is slightly larger in the off-peak T
i
period. For car transport this is due to the fact that off-peak transport is more sensitive to changes in the
consumer price and wage rate than peak transport. For transport by bus, tram and metro, the sensitivity to
changes in the wage rate, speed and the consumption of the good is much higher in the off-peak period.
(2) MCF  and MCF
B    C
The downward pressure on the MCF from the congestion effect of peak road pricing and the fuel
tax is strengthened by the effect on emissions, which is much larger than for the two other instruments.- 39 -
The fall in emissions is mainly due to lower transport emissions. The change in accident costs also
reduces the MCF but is of smaller importance, though it is also larger than in the case of the lump sum
tax and the labour income tax. The impact of the fuel tax on accident and air pollution costs is higher than
for peak road pricing, because transport is reduced more.
(3) The Distributional Impacts of Peak Road Pricing and the Fuel Tax
Table 16 shows that for both instruments the equivalent loss per 1000 persons is higher for
individuals belonging to the richer quintiles. As a consequence the value of the MCF decreases for higher
degrees of inequality aversion (see Table 9). If we express the equivalent loss as a percentage of the
equivalent income in the initial equilibrium, the proportional welfare loss is the highest for individuals
belonging to quintiles 2, 3 and 4. 
As in the model without externalities, the fuel tax and peak road pricing reduce inequality.
However, the proportional reduction in INEQ is lower than for INEQ . This is because the relative welfare
*
impact of the reduction in congestion is high for quintiles 2, 3 and 4. Indeed, when account is taken only
of the impact of the policy measures on congestion, the evolution of INEQ  actually indicates a higher
A
inequality for g = 0.25 and g = 0.5. Inequality is reduced only when the degree of inequality aversion is
sufficiently high or when the welfare impact of the change in air pollution and accidents is included. Of
the two instruments the fuel tax is associated with the highest proportional reduction in inequality. This
contrast with the results of the model without externalities and can be explained by the larger impact of
the fuel tax on air pollution and accidents.
 c.  Revenue Neutral Welfare Improving Tax Reforms and the Link with the Double Dividend
Literature
The results of the balanced budget incidence experiments can be used to decide which revenue
neutral policy reforms are welfare improving with respect to the initial equilibrium. When taking into
account the externalities and for g = 0, the MCF is the lowest for peak road pricing, followed by the fuel
tax, the lump sum tax and the labour income tax. Table 9 indicates that welfare can be improved by
introducing peak road pricing or raising the fuel tax and by recycling the revenue through an increase in
the lump sum transfer or a reduction in the labour income tax. It also suggests that the welfare gain will
be higher for peak road pricing than for the fuel tax and that for both instruments the welfare gain is
higher when the revenue is recycled through a change in the labour income tax rather than the transfer.
Indeed the MCF of the lump sum tax is lower than that of the labour income tax. This is due to the
difference in the gross welfare costs of the two instruments, since the advantage of a lower labour income
tax is somewhat offset by the higher level of congestion, air pollution and accidents in comparison with
the lump sum transfer. Moreover, we know from the model without externalities that the MCF  is larger
*
for the labour income tax than for the lump sum tax when g = 0. 
From Table 16 we can derive that the revenue neutral substitution of peak road pricing or the fuel
tax for the lump sum tax leads to higher welfare gains for the poorer than for the richer quintiles. E.g., the
combination of peak road pricing and a higher lump sum transfer leads to a welfare gain of 21.1 10
-3
ECU (=24.3 10  ECU-13.2 10  ECU) per day per 1000 persons belonging to quintile 1 compared to -1.2
-3    -3- 40 -
10  ECU (=9.9 10  ECU-11.1 10  ECU) for quintile 5. When the revenue is recycled through a lower
-3      -3    -3
labour income tax, the main beneficiaries are the two richest quintiles and the first quintile. 
For higher degrees of income aversion, it is still welfare improving to introduce peak road pricing
or raise the fuel tax and to return the revenue via a lump sum transfer or a lower labour income tax rate.
However, because of the distributional impacts of the policy reforms the welfare gain is now higher when
the revenue is returned through an increase in the lump sum transfer rather than a lower income tax rate.
Table 17 shows that the policy reforms involving revenue recycling through the lump sum
transfer reduce inequality, while the reverse is observed when the labour income tax is reduced instead.
E.g., peak road pricing with lump sum replacement reduces INEQ by -0.0862% (=-0.0021%-0.0842%)
compared to the increase in INEQ by 0.0348% (=-0.0021%+0.0369%) when the labour income tax rate
is lowered.
The link can be made with the double dividend literature, which analyses revenue neutral
environmental tax reforms which consist of increasing the tax on the externality generating good and of
recycling the revenue obtained either by increasing the lump sum transfer or by reducing existing
distortionary taxes. In the terminology of Goulder (1995), a weak double dividend is realised when, by
using the revenues of the externality taxes to finance a reduction in a distortionary tax, one obtains a
gross welfare gain relative to the case where the lump sum tax is used to return the revenues. One can
examine the presence of a weak double dividend by comparing the gross welfare costs of the labour
income tax and the lump sum transfer. Table 8 shows that a weak double dividend is present only for g =
0, since only in that case the MCF  of the labour income tax is larger than that of the lump sum tax. For
*
higher degrees of inequality aversion no weak double dividend can be realised. The stronger versions of
the double dividend hypothesis claim that the revenue neutral substitution of the externality tax for
existing distortionary taxes leads to zero or negative gross welfare costs. Table 8 shows that for g = 0 a
gross welfare gain can be realised when using the revenues of peak road pricing or the fuel tax to finance
a reduction in the labour income tax. The MCF  of the two tax instruments is lower than that of the labour
*
income tax. For g = 0.25 and g = 0.5 a strong double dividend can be realised only for the fuel tax. For
higher degrees of inequality aversion there are no more possibilities for a strong double dividend.
IV. Conclusions and Extensions
The paper calculates the MCF of different policy instruments using an AGE model for Belgium.
The model incorporates three types of externalities: congestion, air pollution (including global warming)
and accidents. It includes non-identical individuals which allows to study the distributional impacts of the
policy reforms. Firstly, the balanced budget incidence analysis shows that the ranking of the policy
instruments in terms of their MCF changes significantly when the effect of the policy reform on the
externalities is taken into account. The effects of the changes in congestion and air pollution are the most
important. Secondly, a higher degree of inequality does not have a large impact on the ranking of the
instruments except for the lump sum tax and the labour income tax whose place in the ranking is
reversed. Thirdly, regardless of the way in which the tax revenue is recycled, the welfare gain of peak road
pricing is shown to be higher than that of the fuel tax, because peak road pricing tackles the congestion
problem in the period in which it is the most stringent and it is applicable to all peak road transport no- 41 -
matter what is their country of origin. 
Fourthly, when the externality tax revenue is recycled through the lump sum tax the welfare gains
are higher for the poorer than for the richer quintiles. On the other hand the main beneficiaries of revenue
recycling through the labour income tax are the two richest and the poorest quintile. As a consequence,
when the social welfare function gives a higher weight to the welfare of individuals belonging to the
poorer quintiles, the distributional impacts of the policy reforms cause the welfare gain to be higher when
the revenue is recycled through an increase in the lump sum transfer rather than through a lower labour
income tax rate. In the former case the level of inequality is reduced, while the reverse is oberved in the
latter case. 
Finally, a weak double dividend is realised only when all individuals are given the same welfare
weight. In the other cases the use of the revenues of the externality taxes to finance a reduction in the
labour income tax leads to a gross welfare cost relative to the case where the lump sum tax is used to
return the revenues. However, the inclusion of distributional considerations offers the possibility of
realising a strong double dividend for low degrees of inequality aversion.
The analysis can be extended in several ways. A first extension consists of the inclusion of non-
separable rather than separable government expenditures which are to be financed by a change in the tax
system. A natural candidate for this would be government spending on transport capacity. Secondly, the
model assumes that there is no voluntary unemployment. We are in a Walrasian setting. Since the labour
market determines the outcome of the model, it might be relevant to model it more realistically. The
presence of involuntary unemployment also has an impact on the marginal value of time. The valuation of
an additional unit of leisure is lower than the wage rate if there is involuntary unemployment, i.e., when
the individual is forced to work less than it wants to. As a consequence the value of a marginal time
saving will be lower than if there is no restriction on the labour supply. This is important for the
evaluation of the benefits of a policy reform. Finally, the assumption that air pollution and accidents enter
the consumer’s preferences in a separable way, can be relaxed. This way, general equilibrium effects of
the change in air pollution and accidents can be incorporated in the model.- 42 -
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14, pp. 295-314.Figure 1a: The Direct Utility Function






Overall direct utility U w=0   Overall direct utility is a Cobb-Douglas type
           function of present and future consumption
Current consumption
of goods and time
Future consumption w=1   Current consumption of goods and time is a
           MCES function of the non-leisure goods and time
           component and excess leisure
non-leisure goods
and time
Leisure w=2   The non-leisure goods and time utility component
           is a MCES function of the transport and the non-tp
           energy and other goods components 
Transport Non-tp energy and
other goods
w=3   The non-tp energy and other goods component
           is a MCES function of the excess quantities of other
           goods and the non-tp energy utility component (see figure 1b)
w=4   The non-tp energy utility component is a MCES
           function of the excess quantities of electricity,
           solid fuels, petrol products and gas 
level
- 45 -Figure 1b: The Direct Utility Function (ctd)
Transport w=3    The transport utility component is a MCES
            function of peak and off-peak transport
Peak Off-peak w=4    In each period, transport is a MCES function





w=5   - Car transport is a MCES function of transport
             by different car types
          - The utility component of the other transport 
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             quantities of physical pkm and transport time







w=6    Car transport by the different vehicle types is a
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w=7   Committed and supplementary mileage are a
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pkm time pkm time w=8   Physical pkm is a Leontief function of vehicle 
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APPENDIX 1: List of symbols
Indices (ordered alphabetically)
d Index of the time period (d=peak, off-peak)
en=1,...,EN Index of non-transport energy goods
g Index of government instruments
i=1,...,I Index of consumer groups
j=1,...,J Index of goods (J=M+K)
k=1,...,K Index of non-transport goods
K Capital good
m=1,...,M Index of transport goods
n Index of accident types
po=1,...,PO Index of air pollutants
r Can take two values: TP for transport goods and NTP for non-transport goods
v Corresponds with the index m; however, v includes external objects as an extra element
Other symbols (ordered alphabetically)
a Number of consumers belonging to consumer group i
i
A ,A ,A , A   The parameters of the time flow relationship. 1,m 2 3   4
ACC The vector of transport accidents
ACC The number of transport accidents of type n in which transport mode m is the victim m
n
ACC The number of transport accidents of type n in the initial equilibrium in which transport mode m m
ref,n
is the victim
ar The probability that an accident of type n occurs between transport modes m and v in which m is m,v
n
the victim
c Endowment of capital services of a consumer belonging to consumer group i
i
CAP Transport infrastructure capacity
dREV Change in separable government spending financed by instrument g g
dSW Monetary value of the change in social welfare caused by instrument g g
e Efficiency parameter
i
EM Vector of emissions of air pollutants EM=(EM ,...,EM ) 1 PO
EM Emissions of air pollutant po po
emen Emissions of pollutant po per unit of consumption of the non-transport energy good en  po,en
emtp Emissions of pollutant po per unit of consumption of the transport good m  po,m
ex The export demand for good j j
  Total world demand for good j
f Utility related to transport accidents ACC
i
f Utility related to emissions of air pollutants EM
i
f Direct utility function U
i
F Traffic flow
F The road traffic flow in period d in millions of passenger car units 
d
Net international transfer by a consumer belonging to consumer group i
Time devoted to labour abroad by a consumer belonging to consumer group i
lh Consumption of leisure by a consumer belonging to consumer group i
i
mu The marginal utility of a decrease in the number of accidents of type n ACC,n
i
mu The marginal utility of a decrease in the emissions of pollutant po  AP,po
i
mu The marginal utility of a time saving in transport T
i
P The poll transfer paid by the government to a consumer belonging to consumer group i
i
ptt  The price of transit transport in the country
The price of transit transport abroad
The world price of good j (expressed in terms of the domestic currency) 
px  The export price of the domestic good j jtt
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qh The consumer price of the non-transport good k NTP,k
qh The consumer price of the transport good m TP,m
qh The consumer price of capital services C
T Endowment of time of each consumer
tt The demand for transit transport in Belgium
Total demand for international transport by foreign firms
U Utility of a consumer belonging to consumer group i
i
V Indirect utility function
i
wabh The after tax foreign wage rate
i
wh The after tax wage rate
i
xab   The input of the foreign transport good m by the foreign production sector j for transport of the TP,m
j
import good j in Belgium
xh K vector of each household’s consumption of non-transport goods xh =(xh ,...,xh )  NTP                   NTP NTP,1 NTP,K
i                   i i i
xh M vector of each household’s consumption of transport goods xh =(xh ,...,xh ) TP                   TP TP,1 TP,M
i                   i i i
xp The input of the non-transport energy good en by the domestic production sector j NTP,en
j
xp The input of the transport good m by the domestic production sector j for domestic delivery of TP,m
j
good j
xt The input of the transport good m for transit transport in Belgium TP,m
xx The input of the transport good m by the domestic production sector j for transport of the TP,m
j
exported good j in Belgium
X Total consumption in Belgium of the non-transport energy good en NTP,en
X Total consumption in Belgium of the transport good m  TP,m
X M vector of total consumption in Belgium of transport goods TP
W Social welfare
Z The congestion level
( The marginal utility to a consumer of saving time in the consumption of transport good m TP,m
i
g Degree of inequality aversion
0t  Minus the elasticity of transit transport in Belgium w.r.t. the price of transit transport in Belgium
0x  Minus the price elasticity of export demand w.r.t. the export price of domestic goods j
2 The minimum time requirement for transport mode m in period d  TP,m
d
2h M vector of time devoted by a consumer to the consumption of transport goods TP
i
2h =(2h ,...,2h ) TP TP,1 TP,M
i i i
2h The minimum time requirement for the consumption of transport good m TP,m
*
8 The marginal utility of income to a consumer belonging to consumer group i
i
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CO Carbon monoxide
CO Carbon dioxide 2
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HC Hydrocarbons
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SO Sulphur dioxide 2
tkm Tonne kilometre
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